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This paper offers a model for the bias found in 
willingness-to-pay valuations against new treatments. For
example, this bias provides an explanation for patient
preferences that make it difﬁcult for formularies to take
treatments off their lists, even when newer treatments
would appear to be clearly preferable. The appeal of the
model, which is based on imperfect information, is that
it is consistent with rational preferences and rational
behavior by patients, which are necessary for standard
models and methods related to decision theory, cost-
effectiveness, and efﬁciency.
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ABSTRACT
Introduction
Economic evaluation, typically using patient 
valuations for health services, is widely used by
both industry and government during the process 
of planning and introducing new treatments. 
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) valuations are advocated
as a means of helping decide about new investments
because they lend themselves to standard cost-
beneﬁt calculations. A perceived problem with WTP
methodology in the health context is a bias against
new treatments, which was recently described in
terms of WTP for a new form of colon cancer
screening in a study by Salkeld et al. [1], who found
that holding everything else constant, patients sig-
niﬁcantly preferred the existing screen to a new type
of screen. Strong preferences for the status quo
screen imply high marginal valuations of that screen
relative to the valuations of the new type of screen.
This ﬁnding has far-reaching implications for the
valuation of health-services innovations.
The bias described by Salkeld et al. [1] is directly
related to patients’ stating far higher willingness-
to-accept (WTA) valuations (i.e., how much they
would have to be paid to give up an existing screen
or other treatment) than WTP valuations (how
much they would pay for a new screen or treat-
ment). Under the usual assumption of declining
marginal utility, one would expect WTA to exceed
WTP by a modest amount, because giving up a
small amount of something would be expected to
lower utility by more, relative to some initial quan-
tity, than utility would rise by adding that same
small amount. Hence, differences between WTA
and WTP could be interpreted in terms of income
effects on the individual’s preference structure. The
theory underlying the measurement of WTA and
WTP, as well as practical issues in designing mea-
surement schemes, viewed in terms of the standard
theory, is discussed thoroughly by Mitchell and
Carson [2]. However, the discrepancy between
WTA and WTP has been seen to be very large (often
WTA is four times larger than WTP) in many exper-
imental economics and valuation studies in various
contexts [3]. In the health context, this suggests 
that patients would be very unlikely to accept new
procedures vis-à-vis established procedures. Also,
Hanemann [4] has pointed out that where the good
in question has no good substitutes, income effects
could be magniﬁed, causing WTP and WTA valua-
tions to differ dramatically even under conventional
assumptions. Our concern here focuses on cases
where alternative treatments are good substitutes,
in which context Hanemann’s explanation does not
apply. Experiments show that subjects can exhibit
large disparities between WTP and WTA even in
such cases.
Various behavioral hypotheses have been
advanced to explain the general discrepancy
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between WTA and WTP [1,3], including the endow-
ment effect [5], models of regret [6], and models of
loss aversion [7]. The endowment model posits that
when people own something they automatically
place an additional value on the item, so that once
something is owned people value it higher than they
would be willing to pay to buy it. It is as if indi-
viduals are not able to foresee the value of owner-
ship at the time of the purchase decision but
experience the value once they own the item. The
regret model is built on the notion that people do
not want to make decisions that could cause them
to experience regret. Hence, people tend to stick to
the status quo to avoid a chance of feeling regret.
The important point is that staying with the status
quo is not viewed as an active decision, and there-
fore, even a bad outcome associated with the status
quo does not produce regret. Loss aversion is the
notion that people value losses more than gains,
where losses and gains are deﬁned in terms of a par-
ticular reference point. Since the status quo deﬁnes
the reference point, the potential gains offered by
an alternative treatment are valued relatively little,
whereas potential losses are heavily valued.
All of these models are consistent with the
observed bias; however, they are not based on ratio-
nal expected-utility decision making and are in-
consistent with even the most basic properties of
preferences: completeness, transitivity, and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives. An easy way to
see this is to note that in all these models the end
result is valued differently depending on the process
or the order of decisions that are made. For
example, if an individual is initially presented with
object A and then later given the option of trading
it for object B, many more individuals will choose
to keep object A than would choose to trade for
object A if they had been given object B originally.
Insofar as decisions are governed by these rules, it
is impossible to relate them to underlying stable
preferences. Individuals do not make decisions that
focus on obtaining preferred outcomes, so choices
cannot be used to infer which outcomes would
make them “better off.” The purpose of this paper
is to draw attention to a simple but general model
of behavior that is consistent with rational prefer-
ences and that accounts for the large differences in
magnitude of WTA values relative to WTP values.
The model illustrates how informational uncer-
tainty and signals, combined with rational prefer-
ences, affect WTP versus WTA valuations. In the
context of health valuation involving WTP mea-
sures, this model predicts a bias against new treat-
ments such as the one documented by Salkeld et al.
[1]. In the model, patients create this bias by
responding rationally to informational signals from
their environments. Note that our model is consis-
tent with Bayesian decision making, although we
have not focused on the formal derivations of that
model. For applications of Bayesian tools to health
decisions, see the recent special issue of the Inter-
national Journal of Technology and Assessment in
Health Care [8]. Nevertheless, our approach differs
from these in that we are applying these tools to
understanding observed decisions rather than as a
proscriptive speciﬁcation.
Model
The model relies on the idea of incomplete knowl-
edge, which we refer to here as value uncertainty.
There are a number of sources of value uncertainty.
Within health services, the uncertainty typically
derives from an inability to judge how valuable the
object will be in actual use. Uncertainty is a partic-
ularly important feature for goods that incorporate
stochastic elements, which is often the case in health
services, and where consumption does not imply
direct knowledge of all relevant outcomes. Judg-
ment of outcomes in health care is often made even
more difﬁcult by the fact that beneﬁts may accrue
over an extended period in an uncertain future and
may themselves be highly abstract.
Even in the case of more concrete goods in health
services such as crutches or bandages, an important
source of uncertainty is the lack of knowledge about
the cost of an acceptable substitute—including the
difﬁculty of locating it. For such goods, we need 
not assume that the underlying preferences are
unknown, but merely that the rational valuation at
a particular point in time is tied to unknown market
prices.
Incorporating the notion of value uncertainty, a
basic illustrative form of a rational model that
explains the WTA-WTP discrepancy is as follows.
Patients are taken to be utility maximizers, where
utility for patient i has the form Yi + vi* di, where
d = 1 if the subject keeps or obtains a treatment or
service, d = 0 otherwise. Yi is the dollar expenditure
on other goods; and vi* is the true value of the treat-
ment/service for subject i. If patient i were a price
taker in a free market for the treatment/service with
knowledge of the true value vi*, he or she would
choose to purchase or retain the treatment/service
so long as vi* > p, where p is the treatment’s price
or opportunity cost, and would choose not to pur-
chase it if vi* < p.
Value uncertainty enters speciﬁcally as the
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assumption that the individual does not observe vi*
but does observe an error-prone signal of the
object’s value, vi = vi* + ei, where ei is the realiza-
tion of a random variable, e, with mean zero. We
may interpret vi as an index capturing directly
observable object characteristics that are associated
with its value, albeit imperfectly. Intuitively, the
variance (e) can be taken as an indicator of value
uncertainty in the sense that if var(e) = 0, there is
no value uncertainty, and vi = vi*. As var(e) grows,
value uncertainty increases, and the observed signal
is a progressively poorer measure of the object’s
actual value. Note that with value certainty, there
will be no WTA-WTP gap predicted by the model.
Given whatever information gave rise to an
initial vi, the patient’s estimate of value vi* can be
written E(vi*Ωvi). When an individual has experi-
ence within the health-care arena, additional infor-
mation becomes available. In the context of a WTP
valuation of a new treatment, the new treatment has
not been incorporated in the patient’s setting, which
informs the patient that others in the same setting
(e.g., physicians or other patients) currently value it
less than the current treatment. Conversely, treat-
ments currently in use imply that others value them
above alternative treatments. The model in this sit-
uation is similar to the notion of “what is must be
best,” echoing the ﬁndings and discussion in Porter
and Macintyre [9]. Note, however, that the model
is not couched in terms of patients experiencing
something and then automatically valuing it more
highly than something they have not experienced.
Rather, patients incorporate “signals” based on
observed choices of their physician and/or other
patients into their expected valuations. After incor-
porating these signals they behave according to
standard rational preference theory.
Returning to the formal model, if the individual
has knowledge only of vi, the expected value of the
object is E(vi* Ωvi). Designate U as an indicator that
the treatment is already in use by others and NU is
an indicator that it is not currently in use. We can
write the expected value for the treatment in use
that has characteristics indexed by vi as E(vi*Ωvi,U)
and the value of a new treatment with the same
observable characteristics as E(vi*Ωvi, NU). It
follows that
(1) E(vi*Ωvi, NU) £ E(vi*Ωvi) £ E(vi*Ωvi, U)
with strict inequality holding when var(e) > 0, and
with the difference increasing with var(e). Again,
the basic intuition is that patients gain information
from observed choices by others. Equation 1 says
that a treatment’s expected value is higher (relative
to a baseline of no knowledge) if one knows that
many other people use, or have used, the treatment
and lower if one knows that others do not use the
treatment. Of course, the magnitude of the impact
of value uncertainty on WTP-WTA discrepancies 
in general will depend on various factors, includ-
ing the particular institutional structure in which an
individual is acting. However, an important predic-
tion from the model in any setting is that greater
uncertainty regarding the new treatment will lead
to a greater bias against the new treatment versus 
a known status quo. This prediction is not found in
previous theories regarding discrepancies in WTA
and WTP. Also, this prediction is consistent with
results found in Salkeld et al. [1], given that the pro-
posed new cancer screen involved considerable
uncertainty to the patient.
The model provides several testable predictions.
Patients respond to information signals in forming
valuations, and we posit that current use of the
treatment is an important source of information.
The theory implies that as other information
becomes more available, patients will rely less on
this source, so the gap between WTP and WTA will
decline. Such a result could be conﬁrmed by random
assignment of subjects to groups receiving various
levels of information about existing and new treat-
ments. Randomized treatment descriptions would
allow analysis of the extent to which valuations of
new and current treatments depend on information.
Similarly, riskier treatments will display greater
levels of value uncertainty, and so the gap between
WTP and WTA will be greater. Again, the pattern
of choices between treatments described as new and
current, where uncertainty for both treatments is
varied, provides a test of the model.
Supportive evidence from tests of a general form
of this model using ordinary goods in an experi-
mental WTP study can be found in Mueser [10]. It
was found that as experimental subjects received
more information about an object, the variation 
in their valuations decline—implying lower value
uncertainty—as does the gap between WTP and
WTA for the objects.
Discussion
There are two important issues to note. First, 
our model does not offer different predictions in
terms of the direction of WTP bias as compared to
the competing explanations discussed above (the
endowment effect, regret, and loss aversion). Those
explanations may still be helpful and appropriate in
speciﬁc contexts. Nevertheless, the model presented
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here helps to explain the discrepancy between WTA
and WTP using a framework derived from conven-
tional individual optimization. This means that the
assumption of rational decision making, in con-
junction with a recognition of the informational
structures that individuals face, can be useful in 
predicting these kinds of behaviors. Equally impor-
tant, the framework here may help in the design of
methods to elicit underlying patient preferences
regarding treatment options.
Second, understanding the impact of information
and signals in general, as well as the decision to
invest in information by patients and provide infor-
mation by physicians and companies promoting
treatments, are important areas for research.
Although beyond the scope of this discussion, the
rational framework presented here can be incorpo-
rated and expanded to address these broader con-
cerns. It is clear that issues surrounding information
and uncertainty will continue to play a key role in
understanding health-care markets and in making
decisions about care. It is imperative that we con-
tinue to improve our understanding of behavior 
and valuation in the context of uncertainty as the
health-care arena continues to strive for optimal
care at a reasonable cost.
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